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MRS. SUMNER SPAULDING, Respondent, v. ARTHUR 
A. CAMERON, Appellant. 
[1] Waters-Surface and Flood Waters-Protection Against-
Evidence.-A finding that inundations of plnintilf's pl'OPl!l·ty 
with mud were caused by defendant's negligence in eonstl'Uct-
ing a fill is sustained by evidence that he t'aih'd to use the 
proper procedure for making stable fills although warned of 
the hazard he was thereby creating. 
[2] Id.-Nuisances.-A negligently constructed fill causing plain-
tiff's property to be inundated with mud and threatening 
repetitions thereof which, unless corrected, would compel her 
to abandon her residence thereon, constitutes II lluisan!'e within 
Civ. Code, § 3479. 
[3] Nuisances-Remedies-Review.-In an action to abate II nui-
sance and for damages, in which the court makes an express 
finding of permanent damage to plaintiff's property based 011 
the continuing threat of future injury, but also makes an 
inconsistent implied finding that the threat clln be removed, 
and where it <'annot be said as a matter of law whether or 
not it can, the appdlate court will affirm that part of 1I 
judgment awarding damages for actual physieal injury, but 
will reverse that part granting injunctive relief Ilnd award-
ing additional dall\ages for loss in market v:tlue by 1'eaSOIi 
of the continuing threat, and will direct the trial (:ourt to 
determine whether the lluisance is permanent. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Otto J. Emme, .Judge. Affirmed in part 
and reversed in part with instructions. 
Action for damages and for injunctive relief. Judgment 
for plaintiff affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
~lartin H. Easton, James A. Gardner, Overton, Lyman, 
Prince & Vermille and Donald H. Ford for Appellant. 
Samuel A. Rosenthal, Prinzmetal & Grant and Leonard 
G. Ratner for Respondent. 
[2] See Cal. Jur., Waters, § 275; Am.Jur., Waters, § 432. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Waters, § 411; [2] Waters, § 2i 5 : 
[3] Nuisances, § 64. 
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TBA YXOH, .I.--l'laintiff owns and occupies a hOllse on 
t hl' ell::;t sidc of San Ysidro Drive, Los Angeles, at the bot-
tom of Pea Villc Canyon. Defendant owns approximately 30 
aeres of land Oil the west slope of the canyon. In the sum-
Iller and fall of 1946 defendant undertook leveling opera-
tions un his property. These operations consisted of remov-
ing the tops of three knolls and casting the earth over the 
sidl's of adjoining canyons, forming fills. Approximately 
one fifth of the earth was pushed over the west side of the 
Pea Vine Canyon northwest of plaintiff's house. In Novem-
ber of 1946 as a result of heavy rains large quantities of 
Illud washed out of defendant's fill, flowed down the canyon, 
surrounded plaintiff's house and inundated the garages lo-
cated on the ground level. Plaintiff brought this action for 
damages and for injunctive relief. 'fhe trial court found 
t hat plaintiff's property had suffered physical damage in 
the amount of $2,732.29, and that its market value had been 
reduced in the amount of $24,000 because of the continuing 
threat of future inundations of mud. It entered judgment 
for damages for both items and also ordered defendant either 
to remove the fill or to "place protective structures around 
. . . lit 1 in such manner that the property of the plaintiff 
will not be endangered or threatened by the existence of 
~i\ldl deposits of loose dirt." Defendant appeals. 
1 t is unnecessary to decide whether in the absence of neg-
lig-cnee defendant would be liable for creating on his prop-
l'l·ty an earth fill that presented a continuing threat of in-
jlll'Y to the property below. [1] There is evidence that 
ill making the fill defendant did not prepare the natural 
hillside to hold the dirt he deposited thereon, nor did he 
make use of available means to compact the earth as it was 
laid down to prevent it from washing away. Experts testi-
tipd that proper procedures for making stable fills were not 
el\lployed. Moreover, defendant was warned during the 
"ollI'Sl' of the leveling operations of the hazard being cre-
ated to the property below. Accordingly, the evidence is 
suftit·ient to support the finding that the inundation of plain-
tiff's property was caused by defendant's negligence in con-
structing the fill. There is also sufficient evidence to sup-
port the finding that the fill constitutes a threat of repeti-
tions of sue-h inundations and will, unless corrected, compel 
plaintiff to abandon her residence. 
[2] On the basis of the foregoing findings it is clear that 
defendant's fill constitutes a nuisance. (Civ. Code, § 3479; 
I 
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Kaicnkal1lp v. ellion Realty Co., 6 Ca1.2d 765, 774, 776 r5!} 
P.2d 473] ; Jlclvor v. ]ICI'cc/,-Fraser Co., 76 Cal.App.2d 247. 
:!54 1172 P.2d 758].) Defendant contends, however, that 
the trial court et'red in allowing damages for the decline in 
market value of plaintiff's property in addition to damages 
for the physical injury, particularly in view of the fact tliat 
it ordered the abatement of the nuisance, the continuation 
of which is the cause of the decrease in the market value. 
Plaintiff, on the other hand, contends that there is in reality 
no way in which defendant can abate the nuisance and that 
it was therefore proper for the trial court to award damages 
caused by the continuing threat of future injury. 
In early decisions of this court it ,vas held that it should 
not be presumed that a nuisance would continue, and damages 
wcre not allowed for a decrease in market value caused by 
the existence of the nuisance but were limited to the actnal 
physical injury suffered before the commencement of the 
action. (Ilopkins v. lV estern Pac. B. Co., 50 Cal. 190, ] 94; 
Set'ery v. Central Pac. B. Co., 51 Cal. 194, 197; see, also, 
Coats v. Atchison T. & S. F. B. Co., 1 Cal.App. 441, 444·445 
[82 P. 640].) The remedy for a continuing nuisance was 
either a suit for injunctive relief or successive actions for 
damages as new injuries occurred. Situations arose, how-
eyer, where injunctive relief was not appropriate or ,vhere 
successive actions were undesirable either to the plaintiff 
or the defendant or both. Accordingly, it was recognized 
that some types of nuisances should be considered pprma· 
lIcnt, and in such cases recovery of past and anticipated 
future damages were allowed in one action. (Eaclws v. L().~ 
Angcles Consolo Elec. By. Co., 103 Cal. 614. 622 [37 P. 750, 
42 Am.St.Rep. 149] ; Williams v. Southern Pac. Co., 150 Cal. 
624, 626-628 [89 P. 599]; Rankin v. DeBare, 205 Cal. 639, 
641 1271 P. 1050] ; see McCormick on Damages, § 127, pp. 
504.505.) 
The clcarest case of a permanent nuisance or trer-::par-::s is 
the onc wherc the offending struetm'e or condition is main-
tained as a necessary part of the operations of a publie 
utility. Since such conditions are ordinarily of indefi-
nite durution and since the utility by making compensation 
is entitled to continue them, it is appropriate that only 
line aetillll sllOuld be allowed to recover for all the damages 
inflicted. It would be unfair to the utility to subject it to 
successive suits and unfair to the injured party if he were 
not allowed to recover all of his probable damagps at once. 
I 
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. (See McCormick, Damages for Anticipated Injury to Land, 
3i Harv.L.Rev. 574, 584-585.) 
A more difficult problem is presented, however, if the de-
fendant is not privileged to continue the nuisance or trespass 
but its abatement is impractical or the plaintiff is willing 
that it continue if he can secure full compensation for both 
past and anticipated future injuries. To attempt categori-
cally to classify such a nuisance as either permanent or not 
may lead to serious injustice to one or the other of the par-
ties. Thus, if the plaintiff assumes it is not permanent and 
sues only for past damages, he may be met with the plea 
of res jUdicata in a later action for additional injury if the 
('ourt then decides the nuisance was permanent in character 
from its inception. (See Slater v. Shell Oil Co., 58 Cal.App.2d 
864, 870 (137 P.2d 713].) Similarly, if the initial injury 
is slight and plaintiff delays suit until he has suffered sub-
stantial damage and the court then determines that the nui-
sance was permanent, the defendant may be able to raise 
the defense that the statute of limitations ran from the tim(' 
of the initial injury. (See Phillips v. City of Pasadena, 27 
Cal.2d 104, 107-108 (162 P.2d 625].) On the other hand, 
jf the defendant is willing and able to abate the nuisanc(', 
it is unfair to award damages on the theory that it will 
continue. (See Meek v. De Latour, 2 Cal.App. 261, 265 [83 
P. 300] ; ct., Collier v. Merced Irr. Dist., 213 Cal. 554, 566 
(2 P.2d 790] ; Colorado P. Co. v. Pacific G. & E. Co., 218 Cal. 
55!), 567 [24 P.2d 495].) . 
Because of these difficulties it has been recognized that 
in doubtful cases the plaintiff should have an election to 
treat the nuisance as either permanent or not. (Kafka v. 
BOZ1:0, 191 Cal. 746, 752 (218 P. 753, 29 A.L.R. 833]; see 
Restatement, Torts, § 930; McCormick on Damages, § 127, 
p. 511 et seq.; 4 Sutherland on Damages [4th ed.] § 1046, 
p. 3874.) If the defendant is not privileged to continue 
the nuisance and is able to abate it, he cannot complain 
if the plaintiff elects to bring successive actions as dam-
ages accrue until abatement takes place. (Phillips v. City 
of Pa..~adena, 27 Ca1.2d 104, 107-108 (162 P.2d 625] ; Stronrl 
v. Sullivan, 180 Cal. 331, 334-335 [181 P. 59, 4 A.L.R. 
343].) On the other hand, if it appears improbable as a 
practical matter that the nuisance can or will be abated, 
the plaintiff should not be left to the troublesome remedy 
of successive actions. (See Restatement, Torts, § 930, com-
I 
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ment c; McCormick, Damages for Anticipated Illjury to 
Land, 37 Han'.TJ,ReY. 5i4. 594-595.) 
The facts of the present case aptly illustrate the problem 
involved. As a result of the nuisance created by defendant, 
plaintiff's property suffered physical h;;:;ury. There is also 
evidence that while the lluisance continues its rental value 
is impaired, and that if the nuisance is not abated its market 
value will continue to be substantially depressed. There is 
evidence that would support the conclusion that there is 
little or nothing defendant can do to abate the nuisance. On 
the assumption that this conclusion is correct, plaintiff con-
tends that she is entitled to recover the full diminution in 
the market value caused by the probable continuation of the 
nuisance. On the other hand, defendant contends that he 
can and will abate the nuisance. There is evidence that 
would support the conclusion that corrective measures taken 
by defendant will prevent further flows of mud. Moreover, 
since defendant intends to make use of the top surface of 
the fill it is not improbable that he will do whatever is prac-
tically possible to stabilize it. On the assumption that he 
has or will be able to abate the nuisance defendant contends 
that plaintiff's damages should be limited to those suffered 
in the past and should not include speculative future losses 
based on the assumption that the nuisance win continue. 
[3] The findings and conclusions of the trial court on 
these conflicting contentions are inconsistent. The court 
found that plaintiff's property had been permanently dam-
aged because of the continuing threat of future injury. It 
also found, however, that this threat would continue unless 
corrective measures were taken, and by ordering that such 
measures be taken impliedly found that they ,vere feasible. 
It is clear that plaintiff cannot have both remedies. If de-
fendant obeys the injunction and takes such measures that 
., the property of the plaintiff will not be endangered or 
threatened by the existence of such deposits of loose dirt," 
there will no longer be a threat to depreciate the value of 
the property. Plaintiff would obtain a double recovery if 
she could recover for the depreciation in value and also 
lIa vc the cause of that depreciation removed . 
. A similar problem was presented in Meek v. De Latour, 2 
Cal.App. 261 [83 P. 300]. In that case plaintiff secured 
a judgment ordering the abatement of a cream of tartar 
factory and awarding damages. In compliance with the 
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jlldg'lllPut thl' fal'tOl'Y was l'PIlH)Vp(L ana 011 app<'al it was 
lIPid that ('vidl'llc'(' 01' the (\cel'N1SC in Jluu'kl't "aluc caused 
by its prl'sencc was inadmissible. "It seelUs perfectly clear 
thllt such testimony ... , where the abatement of a nuisance 
is sought, is inadmissible 011 the qnestion of damages. Other-
wisl' a plaintiff could reeover for the depreciation in value 
of his property and at the same time remove the deprecia-
tion by abating the canse of it." (2 Cal.App. at 265.) 
In th<' present case it cannot be said as a matter of law 
that the nuisance can or cannot be abated. In view of 
the inconsistent findings and the conflict in the evidence, 
it would be inappropriate for this court to determine whether I 
the nuisance is in fact permanent and to modify the judg. 
ment by striking the damages for loss of market value on 
the assumption it is not permanent, or by striking the in-
junctive provisions on the assumption that it is. (Tupman 
Y. IIabel'kern, 208 Cal. 256, 269-270 [280 P. 970].) 
Since plaintiff has proved defendant's liability for the 
actual physical injmy to the property the judgment should 
bl> affirmed to the extent that it awards $2,732.29 dam· 
ages for that injury. 'ro the extent that the judgment 
uwards additional damages and also grants injunctive reo 
lief it must be reversed. On retrial the trial court should 
dete!'mine whether or not the nuisance is in fact permanent. 
1 f it finds that it is, it should enter judgment for the de-
l'!'ease in market value. If it finds that it is not, it should 
g'l'llllt injunctive relief and such additional damages as may 
bl' pl'o\'ed for the temporary decrease in the value of the 
use of the property while the nuisance continued. (See 
Bou.rdieu v. Seaboard Oil Corp., 48 Cal.App.2d 429, 437-
4:18 [119 P.2d 973] ; Gltttingcr v. Calave1'Os Cement Co., 105 
Cal.App.2d 382,387 [233 P.2d 914] ; :McCormick on Damages, 
§ 127. pp. 503-504.) 
To the extent that it awards damag<'s of $2,732.29 the 
judgment is affiruwd. III all otllE'r respects the judgment 
is 1'(>\'l'l's('ll and the l'anse is remandell to the trial court with 
illstl'lldions todetel'lIIine Oil the basis of the evidence previ. 
ollsly p!'esented ana sueh additional evidence as may be pre· 
s('lltf'd b~' the pal·ties whether or not the nuisance is in fact 
]W!·IlHI11f'nt. Bach party is to hf'ar his own l'osts on this appeal. 
Gibson. C. J .. Shenk .• J., Edmonds. J .. Schauer, J" and 
Spence •• r., conem"l·ed. 
/ 
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C~AHTEH, J.-I dissent. 
~il 
1 alll of the opinion that the portion of the judgment for 
damages should be affil'med and the injuneth'e feature either 
anH'ndrd or affil'llled as correctly construed, 
In this easc the defemlant negligently llIaintailled loose 
dirt on his land which has in the past, when it rained. mOY(',l 
onto plaintiff's land. The court expressly found that surh 
('OlHlition rxisting on defendant's land permanently drpre-
t'iated tht' market yalue of plaintiff's land as follows: " ... 
b~' reason of the acts of the defendant .. , plaintiff's prop-
rrty has !mfferpd a substantial and permanent impairment of 
yalue and has lo.~t its desirability as a residence for plain-
tiff. 01' any prospeetiye purchasers; that it is true that the 
fair market yalue of the house on plaintiff's property br-
fore the deposit of the loose dirt, Rnd the damage occa ... ioned 
thcreby. was the sum of $40,000.00, and that the fair re-
sale yalnc of said house after the damage caused b~' the 
d!'fendant . , , was the sum of $16,000.00, to plaintiff's dC'h'i-
ment and damage ill the sum of $24,000.00, and it is true 
that the maintenanre by the defendant ... of the loose 
quantities of dirt on his premises will cause plaintiff great 
and irreparable injury and will permanently deprive plain-
tiff's lalhl of allY yalne for residential purposes." (Italie!'; 
added.) It is conceded by the majority that that fillrling is 
snpported by the evidence. The majority opinion sa~-s. ho\\,-
ewi', that there is an ineollsistent finding to the effect that 
the ('onditioll on defrndant's land is not permanent-('an 
be abated. There is no e:rpress finding to that effect. .\s-
sUlning there is an implied finding flowing from the fact 
that an injunction was given, then the duty of this court 
is to lib!'rally eonstrne the findings to support the part of 
the jlldgment based upon snch findings, rather than rewrs-
illg thc entire jUdgment. Thus the implied inconsistent 
fhHling that the eondition can be abated may be ignorcrl. 
81Hl the pal't of the judgment awarding injunctin~ l'f'lif'f 
n'\·C'I'sed. ",hill' affirming the (lamage portion which is basf'rl 
on an e.rpre.~.~ finding of pcrmanent damage. In line with 
the sett\e(l rule that findings must be liberally construed to 
support the judgment and specific findings control oyer gen-
eral 0lW8 (24 CaLTnr. 1007 et seq.) an exprcss finding pre-
yails oyer an implie(l onC'. (See Centmlll. Imp. Co. v. Memo-
rial Pa/·ks. Inc., 40 CaJ.\pp.2tl 591 [105 P.2d 596].) 
It is not lIe('essary. however, to re\'el'se the in.inncti\'e pro-
vision in the ,indgnwnt, for correctly construed. nnder th" 
) 
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mIl' rl'qu11'Ing libl'ral ('onstriIction to support it, there. is 
no inconsistency. So interpreted, it enjoins only the main-
tenance in the futme by defendant on his land of additional 
loose soil, that is, in addition to what is already there. The 
findings nre readily susceptible of that construction. It is 
found that "Plaintiff is entitled to a permanent restraining 
order against the defendant, enjoining . . . defendant . . . 
from excavating, rl'-slIrfacing or distrib'tding his said land 
and depositing loose dirt in any manner which may threaten 
or endanger the residenl'e of the plaintiff, and ordering the 
defendant . . . to rl'move deposits of loose dirt upon his 
said land, or ill lieu thereof, to place protecting structures 
around said loose dirt in such a manner that the property 
of the plaintiff will not be endangered or threatened by the 
existence of deposits of loose dirt." (Italics added.) . It 
,vill be noted that the participle form of the verbs "excavate, 
re-surface or distribute" speak in the future. It could not 
be speaking of the past because that soil had already been 
f'xcayated and distributed. The removal of the dirt being 
in the same tenor, refers to t.he dirt to be distributed in \he 
future, after the entry of the judgment. It is true that 
the judgment also refers to the removal of dirt theretofore 
deposited. That portion of the judgment is out of harmony 
with the findings and should he modified. 
I would therefore modify the judgment with respect. to 
injunctive relit'f against dirt already deposited on defend-
ant's land and affirm the judgment as so modified. 
The opinion and jUdgment were modified to read as above 
printed and respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied 
February 14, 1952. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the 
petition should be granted. 
